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Abstract
This paper investigates the character of labor supply and especially female labor force
participation in Egypt and its evolution over the twenty-year span from 1988 to 2018 using
various waves of the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey. The paper pays particular attention to
women’s labor force outcomes while examining trends in labor force participation,
employment, and unemployment. The population and labor supply in Egypt are analyzed by
demographic characteristics such as age, sex, educational attainment, and location.
Demographic changes, including in age at marriage and fertility, are explored as important
determinants of both labor supply and women’s participation.
Keywords: Labor Force Participation, Unemployment, Employment, Population
Growth, Egypt
JEL Classifications: J00, J21, J64, J11
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1. Introduction
Egypt’s labor market has faced a number of challenges since the turn of the century. In the 1990s
the economy struggled with substantial structural reforms and labor supply pressures related to the
youth bulge. While labor market conditions improved in the early 2000s, the global financial crisis
and the ensuing global economic slowdown were a challenge for Egypt as well. Soon after this
challenge, the January 25, 2011 revolution led to a period of substantial political and economic
uncertainty. Economic growth has recovered in recent years after the introduction of a series of
economic reforms and the stabilization of the political situation, but Egypt continues to face the
long-term challenges of creating enough productive employment for its growing and increasingly
educated workforce (World Bank 2019).
This paper investigates Egypt’s labor supply, starting with the growth and changing composition
of the working age population. Subsequently, we examine the changing patterns of labor force
participation by gender, age and education. These patterns mediate between the demographic
trends and the actual patterns of labor supply in the economy. As part of our focus on female labor
force participation, we examine changes in the timing of marriage and fertility, as well as their
implications for the labor force behavior of women. To understand the evolution of labor supply,
the paper uses data from the four waves of the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS)
conducted in 1998, 2006, 2012, and 2018, as well as, when possible, data from the 1988 special
round of the Labor Force Survey (LFS). This breadth of data allows us to study how the
demographic structure of the population and labor force behavior have evolved over several
decades.5 This work builds on previous research on the evolution of labor supply in Egypt using
the preceding waves of the ELMPS (Assaad and Krafft 2015b; a; Assaad 2002, 2009).
The main finding that emerges from our analysis is that labor supply pressures have subsided
greatly during the 2012-18 period as the growth of the youth and young adult populations abated.
The reduced demographic pressure on labor supply was compounded by a decline in labor force
participation and employment rates among both men and women. The decline in participation
among men is a relatively recent phenomenon and one affecting both younger and older men and
men at all education levels. The decline in participation among women has occurred despite the
substantial increase in educational attainment among women and the traditionally strong
relationship between education and economic participation for women in Egypt. Rates of
participation have steadily declined among educated Egyptian women since 1998. The decline is
most likely driven by the reduction in employment opportunities in the public sector, without a
commensurate increase in suitable opportunities in the private sector. This trend especially affects
married women. While overall unemployment rates, measured in the standard way, have remained

For more information on ELMPS 1998, see Assaad and Barsoum (2000). For more information on ELMPS 2006,
see Barsoum (2009). For more information on ELMPS 2012, see Assaad and Krafft (2013). For more information on
ELMPS 2018, see Krafft, Assaad, and Rahman (2019). ELMPS 2018 data will be publicly available from
www.erfdataportal.com in late October 2019.
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fairly stable since 2006, broad unemployment has increased more, reflecting a rise in discouraged
unemployment among both men and women.
In what follows, we characterize the evolution of the working age population, labor force
participation, employment, and unemployment from 1988 to 2018 by age, sex, educational
attainment and location. Since marriage and childbearing and childrearing particularly affect
women’s labor force participation, we further show important trends in age at marriage and fertility
as well as their relationship with labor supply.
2. Demographic Change in Egypt
In this section, we focus on key aspects of demographic change in Egypt. We start with population
growth for the population as a whole and for various age sub-groups of particular relevance to
labor supply. We also examine the evolution of the age and geographic compositions of the
population. We end the section by examining marriage and fertility trends as key determinants of
both population trends and trends in women’s labor force participation.
2.1. Population Growth and The Age Composition of the Population
Over the past several decades, one of the main feature of Egypt’s demographic transition has been
the emergence of a pronounced “youth bulge” resulting from rapidly falling early childhood
mortality, especially in the early 1980s, which was not matched by a commensurate decline in
fertility (Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi 2007; Miller and Hirschhorn 1995; Rashad 1989; Robinson
and El-Zanaty 2006).
As shown in Figure 1, the bulge generation was still in its infancy in 1988 and moved to the 10-14
and 15-19 age groups in 1998. By 2006, the “youth bulge” was at its peak, with a clear rise in the
share of the 15-19 and 20-24 age groups. By 2012, the bulge had shifted to the 25-29 age group,
many of whom were already starting to have children, leading to an “echo” among those aged 0-4
(Krafft and Assaad 2014a). By 2018, the “bulge” generation had reached the age of 30-34 and the
“echo” generation was centered around school-entry age, namely 5-9. The size of the echo was
compounded by a temporary increase in the total fertility rate (TFR) from 3.0 to 3.5 children per
woman, an issue which we return to below (Krafft 2016; Ministry of Health and Population, ElZanaty and Associates, and ICF International 2015).
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Figure 1. Population structure of Egypt (percentage in five-year age group), by wave

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from LFS 1988 and ELMPS 1998-2018.

The changing age structure of the population had direct implications for the rates at which various
age groups of relevance to the labor supply were growing. As shown in Table 1, Egypt’s overall
population has been growing at a fairly stable rate of about 2% per annum (p.a.) over the thirty
year period from 1988 to 2018. However, this overall rate of population growth masks substantial
variations in population growth across age groups. From 1988 to 1998, the most rapidly growing
age group was youth aged 15-24, which grew at 3.4% p.a., more than one and half times the rate
of overall population growth (2.1% p.a.), a phenomenon that reflected the peak of the youth bulge.
This led to a fairly rapid growth of the working age population at a rate of 3.0% p.a. and,
accordingly, substantial labor supply pressures.
In the 1998-2006 period, the bulge had moved to the young adult population (ages 25-29), which
grew at a rate of 5.0% p.a., continuing strong labor supply pressures, especially among the
relatively educated, who enter the labor market at a later age and tend to spend longer in
unemployment upon entry. The growth of the working age population slowed somewhat during
this period to 2.5% p.a.
In the 2006-12 period, the young adult age group continued to grow fast at 4.2% p.a., but the youth
group actually contracted at a rate of 2.3% p.a. This shift marked the start of a period of reduced
labor supply pressures, which dropped the growth of the working age population to only 1.2% p.a.
The emergence of the echo of the bulge was clearly apparent in the growth of the child population
during this period. After having grown at only 0.5% p.a. during the previous period, the child

4

population growth accelerated to 3.8% p.a., reflecting both the growth in the population of women
in their peak child-bearing years as well as the increase in fertility we referred to above.
In the 2012-18 period, the contraction reached the young adult population, which declined at a rate
of 2.9% p.a. Together, with the slow growth of the youth population (0.3% p.a.), this marked a
period of reduced labor supply pressure. At the same time, the resumption of fertility decline
resulted in a slight deceleration of the child population growth to 1.9% p.a.
Thus, the aging of the “bulge” generation means that labor supply pressures have subsided
somewhat in the 2010s, but the progression of the “echo” suggests that these pressures are likely
to resume soon. The effects of the echo are now being felt in the primary education system and
will eventually reach the labor market within the next ten to fifteen years.
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Table 1. Average annual growth rates (percentages) of the total population and selected age
groups, by wave
Young Working
Children
Youth
All
Adults
Age
Ages:
Urban
1988-1998
1998-2006
2006-2012
2012-2018
Rural
1988-1998
1998-2006
2006-2012
2012-2018
Total
1988-1998
1998-2006
2006-2012
2012-2018

0-14

15-24

25-29

15-64

0.1
0.2
4.5
0.7

2.4
1.8
-2.6
-0.8

-0.3
5.4
2.8
-3.6

2.3
2.4
1.1
0.3

1.7
1.9
2.2
0.6

0.4
0.7
3.4
2.6

4.1
2.4
-2.2
1.0

1.7
4.6
5.3
-2.4

3.6
2.6
1.4
2.2

2.3
1.9
2.2
2.4

0.3
0.5
3.8
1.9

3.4
2.2
-2.3
0.3

0.8
5.0
4.2
-2.9

3.0
2.5
1.2
1.3

2.1
1.9
2.2
1.7

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from LFS 1988 and ELMPS 1998-2018.

Using the most recent wave of the ELMPS from 2018, Figure 2 shows the age structure of the
population in urban and rural areas by sex in the form of population pyramids. This figure shows
that, in 2018, the bulge was fairly pronounced in both the 30-34 and 35-39 age groups in urban
areas and the 30-34 age group in rural areas. The trough that follows the bulge (in 2018, centered
on the 20-24 age group) was also more pronounced in urban areas. The echo was apparent in both
contexts, but was attenuating faster in urban areas, due to faster fertility declines there.6
Additionally, among the youngest cohorts in rural areas (aged 0-9), there were slightly higher
percentages of young boys compared to young girls, likely due to son preference (Yount, Langsten,
and Hill 2000).

6

See Krafft, Keo, and Fedi (2019) for an exploration of fertility patterns by location.
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Figure 2. Population structure of Egypt (percentage in age group), by location and sex, 2018

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 2018.

The population structure patterns are clearly reflected in the differential rates of growth of various
age groups in urban and rural areas. Returning to Table 1, we can see that higher fertility in rural
areas resulted in a higher rate of population growth there relative to urban areas. Rural areas also
experienced a higher rate of growth of the youth population in the 1988-98 period and a more
pronounced growth of the young adult population in the 2006-12 period. In the 2012-18 period,
rural areas were still experiencing a fairly high growth in the working age population (2.2% p.a.),
whereas that growth had slowed down substantially in urban areas to just 0.3% p.a.
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2.2. The Regional Composition of the Population
The ELMPS does not cover the Frontier governorates, so to analyze the geographic distribution of
the population over time, we examine six regions: Greater Cairo, Alexandria and the Suez Canal
region, Urban Lower Egypt, Urban Upper Egypt, which constitute the 4 urban regions, and Rural
Lower Egypt and Rural Upper Egypt, which constitute the two rural regions.7 Figure 3 shows the
distribution of the population by region and survey wave. The share of the population in rural areas
has increased between 1988 and 2018 from 56% to 60%. This appears to be most directly because
of the consistent (but small) increases in Rural Lower Egypt, from 29% of the population in 1988
to 33% in 2018. Rural Upper Egypt first experienced a decline in is share from 1988 to 1998,
stability from 1998 to 2012, and then a slight increase in its share from 2012 to 2018. The region
that has experienced the greatest decline in its population share over time was the Greater Cairo
region, whose share went from 22% in 1988 to 16% in 2018. Other urban regions have essentially
maintained their share, at least since 1998.
Figure 3. Population (percentage) by region and wave

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from LFS 1988 and ELMPS 1998-2018.

The Frontier governorates include Red Sea, El-Wadi El-Gedid, Matrouh and North and South Sinai. Together these
governorates constituted 1.7% of Egypt’s population in 2017 (CAPMAS 2019). Greater Cairo includes Cairo
governorate and the cities of Giza in Giza governorate and Shobra El-Kheimah in Kalyubia governorate. The
Alexandria and Suez Canal region includes Alexandria, Suez and Port-Said governorates, which are entirely urban, as
well as the urban portions of Ismailia governorate. The remaining locations are allocated to urban and rural Lower
and Upper Egypt depending on whether they are urban or rural. In Greater Cairo, less than half a percent (0.3%) of
people across all 5 waves of the ELMPS (N=80) were in rural areas. Therefore, we discuss Greater Cairo as an
exclusively urban region.
7
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2.3. Trends in Fertility and Marriage Patterns
As shown in Figure 4, the total fertility rate (TFR) in Egypt has been on a generally declining trend
since 1980, but this trend has slowed appreciably since 1997, with important periods of increasing
fertility. The first reversal was in the 1997-2000 period, when fertility increased from 3.3 to 3.5.
Fertility resumed its decline from 2000 to 2008 (3.0), albeit at a somewhat slower trend than in the
1980 to 1997 period. More recently, there was a second reversal, from 2008 to 2012, when the
TFR increased from 3.0 to 3.5 children per woman and then remained at that level in 2014. The
2018 wave of the ELMPS is the first to confirm that the decline in TFR has resumed since the last
round of the Demographic Health Survey (DHS), which was carried out in 2014. At 3.1 children
per woman, the TFR in 2018 remains slightly higher than its lowest recorded level of 3.0 children
per woman reached in 2006 and 2008.
Figure 4. Total fertility rate (births per woman) over time

Source: TFRs for 1980-2005 and 2008 are from El-Zanaty & Way (2009) and are primarily Demographic and Health
Survey statistics. TFR for 2014 is from the 2014 Demographic and Health Survey (Ministry of Health and Population,
El-Zanaty and Associates, and ICF International 2015). TFRs for 2006 and 2012 from Krafft (2016). TFRs for 2018
based on authors’ calculations using STATA program tfr2 on the ELMPS 2018.
Notes: TFRs for 1980, 1984, and 1991 are 12 months preceding the survey. TFRs for 2018, 2012 and 2006 are three
years preceding the survey, remainder are 1-36 months preceding the survey.
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One important other aspect of fertility change that is worthy of note is that contraceptive
prevalence rates have increased. Among currently married women aged 15-49, 62.6% were taking
some steps to prevent pregnancy in ELMPS 2018, compared to only 58.5% in the DHS 2014
(Ministry of Health and Population, El-Zanaty and Associates, and ICF International 2015). The
63% rate is the highest contraceptive prevalence rate ever observed in Egypt; rates were around
60% in 2003-2008. The increased prevalence also includes a slight increase in the use of IUDs
(from 51.4% in DHS 2014 to 53.3% in ELMPS 2018) as well as the pill (from 27.4% in DHS 2014
to 34.9% in ELMPS) along with a decrease in injectables (from 14.5% in DHS 2014 to 10.0% in
ELMPS 2018). The changes in family planning prevalence and mix may have played an important
role in the recent fertility decline.
As suggested by the trends in age-specific fertility rates (ASFR) shown in Figure 5, the observed
decrease in TFR between 2012 and 2018 was primarily driven by decreased child bearing for
women aged 25 to 39. There was hardly any change in fertility among those 20-24 from 2012 to
2018. As a result, the 20-24 cohort had the highest ASFR (188 births per 1,000 women) by 2018,
unlike previous waves where the highest levels were reached at age 25-29. ASFRs at ages 25-29
and 30-34 were lower in 2018 than 2012 and even slightly lower than in 2006 for the 25 to 34 age
group. The reversal in the unusual increase in fertility that was observed between 2006 and 2012
is welcome news. Egypt’s demographic future will depend on whether fertility continues to
decline, stabilizes, or reverses again.
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Figure 5. Age specific fertility rates (ASFRs, births per 1,000 women) by wave, women aged
15-49

Source: ASFRs for 2006 and 2012 from Krafft (2016). ASFRs for 2018 based on authors’ calculations using STATA
program tfr2 on the ELMPS 2018.

Changes in age at marriage are related to both changes in fertility and women’s labor force
participation. Figure 6 examines the proportion of men and women married at various ages, by
birth year. The proportion of women married by age 16 has fallen across cohorts, but the share
married by age 18, after falling for cohorts born in 1960 through the early 1980s, has stabilized at
around 25%. The proportion married by age 20 was just under 50% for those born in 1960, fell for
cohorts born in the 1960s and 1970s and then has started to rise again for women born in the 1980s
and 1990s, suggesting that the trend in increasingly late marriage has reversed.8 A similar albeit
more pronounced pattern is observed for those married by age 22. As a result, the median age at
marriage for women aged 15-59 in 2018 was 21 years old, lower than the previous 22 years old
(Assaad, Krafft, and Selwaness 2017). The increase in the proportion married by these ages may
have contributed to the increase in ASFR for 20-24 year-olds between 2006 and 2012, as women

See Assaad, Krafft, and Rolando (2017) and Assaad and Ramadan (2008) for a discussion of how changes in housing
laws in Egypt have contributed to reducing the age of marriage.
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in Egypt usually attempt to commence childbearing promptly after marriage. The shares of women
married at older ages (25, 28) have also risen, suggesting that marriage age has declined across its
entire distribution. While the share of men married at each age also rose over time (corroborating
the possible effect of housing laws on allowing both men and women to marry earlier), there is
some evidence that this trend may be reversing for the youngest cohort of men. Spousal age gaps
and the structure of the youth bulge and echo may have resulted in a temporary decrease in the
supply of younger (female) spouses for men. These marriage market dynamics merit further
investigation.
Figure 6. Proportion married at various ages, by sex and birth year

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 2018.
Notes: Lowess running mean smoother with bandwidth two.

3. Trends in Educational Attainment
Along with the size and age structure of the population, its education composition is a critical
aspect of labor supply. We examine the evolution of educational attainment along six education
levels as is typical in Egypt: illiterate, read and write, less than intermediate (equivalent to
elementary and lower secondary), intermediate (equivalent to upper secondary), above
intermediate (2-year post-secondary), and university and higher (4-year post-secondary and
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higher). We focus on individuals aged 25-64, to capture those who are most likely to have
completed their educational progression.
Over time, there have been large declines in illiteracy and steady increases in higher levels of
education, such as intermediate and university degrees or higher. As shown in Figure 7, between
1988 and 2018, the share of the population that was illiterate was halved, falling from 55% to 27%.
Over the same span, there has been a 23 percentage point increase in the share of the adult
population with intermediate education (from 11% to 34%) and a 10 percentage point increase for
those with university degrees or higher (from 9% to 19%). The reductions in illiteracy and the
increases in intermediate and university education were even larger for women, who started with
a higher level of illiteracy and lower educational attainment. Although women were almost twice
as likely as men to be illiterate in 2018 (34% vs 19%), like men they experienced a 51% decline
in their illiteracy rates since 1988 (from 70% to 34%). The proportion of women ending up with
intermediate degrees increased from 8% to 31% over the 30 year period from 1988 to 2018
compared to from 14% to 37% for men. Similarly, the proportion of women attaining university
education or higher increased from 6% to 17%, compared to from 13% to 21% for men. The gender
gap in higher education has therefore narrowed from 7 percentage points in 1998 to 4 percentage
points in 2018.
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Figure 7. Educational attainment (percentage), by sex and wave, ages 25-64

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from LFS 1988 and ELMPS 1998-2018.
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An examination of educational attainment by cohort of birth shows that large changes in attainment
occurred for cohorts born between 1955 and 1975, but that the rate of increase in attainment
moderated somewhat for more recent cohorts. Figure 8 illustrates the highest level of education
completed by year of birth for all individuals between the ages of 25 and 64 in 2018 (i.e. born
between 1953 and 1993). The percentage of people who remained illiterate dropped substantially,
from nearly 50% of those born in the early 1950s to nearly 15% of those born in the early 1990s.
The share of those who can only read and write or had less than an intermediate education remained
fairly stable. As illiteracy decreased, the categories that increased the most were intermediate
education and university and above education. The intermediate education category is made up
mostly of technical secondary degree holders, since those obtaining general secondary degrees
tend to go on to higher education (Assaad 2010). This category increased very rapidly to about
35% for those born in 1975 and then its increase slowed somewhat for subsequent cohorts. It
reached just over 40% for those born in the early 1990s, becoming by far the most common
educational attainment in Egypt in recent years. The proportion with university education was slow
to increase at first, but started taking off for those born in 1970 only to see its growth slow as well
among recent cohorts. By the cohorts born in the 1990s, more than 20% had acquired university
education or higher.
Figure 8. Educational attainment (percentage) by year of birth, aged 25-64, 2018

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 2018.
Notes: Lowess smoothed running mean with bandwidth two. Restricted to those cohorts aged at least 25 (birth year in
1993 or earlier) to ensure educational attainment is the final degree.
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Commensurate with the increase in levels of education overall, the average years of schooling has
continued to rise for both men and women (Figure 9). Among those aged 25-64 in 2018, men
averaged 9.3 years of school and women 7.6 (the average was 8.4 overall). Despite the narrowing
of the education gender gap over time, for those born in 1985 or later the gap between men and
women has persisted, with a difference of about one additional year in school on average for men.
This gender gap is closing among younger cohorts, not shown; for instance, in both the 2012 and
2018 waves, there was less than a percentage point difference in enrollment between girls and boys
aged 6-17. The rising education levels in Egypt and closing of the gender gap have critical
implications for the nature of the labor supply and Egypt’s potential human resources.
Figure 9. Average years of schooling by year of birth and sex, 2018

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 2018.
Notes: Lowess smoothed running mean with bandwidth two. Restricted to those cohorts aged 25+ (birth year in 1993
or earlier) to ensure educational attainment is the final degree.

4. The Evolution of the Labor Force and Labor Force Participation
4.1. Trends in the Labor Force
While the working age population is a measure of potential labor supply, the actual size of the
labor force results from how this potential is realized through labor force behavior, i.e. employment
and job-seeking behavior. The economically active population or labor force consists of the
employed and unemployed, but there are varying definitions of both these concepts that result in
several possible definitions of the labor force. In all the definitions we discuss here, we limit
ourselves to the current labor force, which is based on a reference period of the seven days that
precede the date of the interview. We also focus our attention on the labor force aged 15-64.
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We primarily use a market definition of employment, which is equivalent to the “work for pay or
profit” definition of the 19th International Conference of Labor Statisticians (ILO 2013). The
market definition of employment includes all of those who were occupied for at least one hour per
week in an activity for the purpose of obtaining either pay or profit, as either wage workers,
employers, self-employed workers, or unpaid family workers. The extended labor force definition
of economic activity further includes those who were involved in the production or processing of
primary commodities for own household consumption, sometimes referred to as subsistence work.
We distinguish between two types of unemployment, standard unemployment and broad
unemployment. Under both definitions, the unemployed must want to work, to have not worked
even one hour in the past seven days according to the definition of work used, and to be available
to start work within two weeks. The standard definition of unemployment further adds a search
criterion, that an individual actively searched for work within the past three months. The broad
definition of unemployment does not require search and therefore includes among the unemployed
the discouraged unemployed who are no longer actively searching. With two definitions of
employment and two of unemployment, there are four possible definitions of the labor force. The
special round of the Labor Force Survey of October 1988 only captured the extended definition of
employment.
According to the standard market definition of the labor force (which is the most restricted
definition among the four), the labor force in Egypt grew from 17 million in 1998 to 25 million in
2018 (Figure 10). This growth at an average annual rate of 1.9% p.a. is similar to the 1.8% p.a.
growth rate of the working age population during that 20-year period (Table 2). The similarity of
the growth rate of the labor force and that of the working age population over the long-run masks
substantial variations over time. Over the period 1998-2006, the rate of growth of the standard
market labor force substantially exceeded that of the working age population (3.7% p.a. vs 2.5%
p.a.). This was in part due to the fact that this was a period of rapid growth in the young adult
population as we saw in Table 1. This rate slowed substantially in the 2006-12 period, when the
standard market labor force grew slower than the working age population (0.8% pa. vs. 1.2% p.a.)
(Table 2). The growth rate of the standard market labor force slowed even further in the 20122018 period to just 0.4% p.a. as compared to 1.3% p.a. for the working age population. These
results imply that the participation rate in the standard market labor force declined substantially at
the same time the growth of the potential labor force was slowing.
Using the most expansive definition of the labor force, the broad extended definition, the Egyptian
labor force grew from 22 million in 1998 to 30 million in 2018 or at a rate of 1.5% p.a., somewhat
slower than the growth of the working-age population. Again, there was a great deal of variation
over time in the growth of the labor force by this definition. It grew at 2.8% p.a. in 1998-2006,
contracted by -0.4% p.a. from 2006 to 2012 and then grew again by 1.5% p.a. from 2012 to 2018.
The more rapid growth of the labor force by this definition relative to the standard market
definition suggests that the number of discouraged unemployed was growing rapidly and also the
number of individuals (especially women) engaged in subsistence activities at home.
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Until 2012, which definition of the labor force one used did not matter too much for men. The
male labor force consisted of 13 million in 1998, 17 million in 2006, and 19 million in 2012,
regardless of the definition used (Figure 10). By 2018, the estimate varied from 19.2 million for
the standard market labor force to 19.8 million for the broad extended labor force. However, which
definition one uses matters a lot for the estimation of the female labor force. In 1998, the female
labor force estimate varied from 3.9 million according to the most restrictive definition (the
standard market definition) to more than double, 8.6 million according to the most expansive
definition (the broad extended definition). The difference was almost all due to the large number
of women who engage exclusively in subsistence work. By 2018, the standard market female labor
force had grown to 5.5 million, a rate of growth of 1.8% p.a. from 1998 to 2018, but the broad
extended labor force had grown to 10.0 million, implying a lower growth rate of 0.8% p.a. Thus,
over time, women in Egypt were somewhat more likely to engage in market work than in
subsistence work. The female standard market labor force actually contracted at a rate of 0.1% p.a.
in the 2012-18 period, in contrast to the female broad extended labor force, which grew at a rate
of 3.2% p.a. (Table 2).
Comparing the standard and broad definitions of the market labor force allows us to ascertain the
degree to which discouraged unemployment has grown. The contrast is particularly large for
women, for whom the broad market labor force grew at 1.2% p.a. as compared to the 0.1% p.a.
contraction of the standard market labor force. This suggests that discouraged unemployment
(which is the difference between the two) grew substantially among women in the 2012-18 period.
Although 635 thousand women were identified as discouraged unemployed in 2018 (12.4% of all
active women), 158 thousand were identified as such in 2012. These figures imply that the rate of
growth of discouraged unemployment between 2012 and 2018 was a dramatic 23% p.a. for
women, as compared to 11% for men.
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Figure 10. Size of working age population and labor force (millions), by definition, sex and
wave, ages 15-64

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from LFS 1988 and ELMPS 1998-2018.
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Table 2. Average annual growth rates (percentages) of the working age population and labor
force, by wave
Working
Standard
Standard
Broad
Broad ext.
age pop. market LF
ext. LF market LF
LF
Men
1988-1998
3.1
2.0
2.0
1998-2006
2.4
3.0
3.2
2.9
3.1
2006-2012
1.2
1.6
1.5
1.6
1.5
2012-2018
1.3
0.5
0.6
0.6
0.7
Women
1988-1998
2.9
3.5
3.4
1998-2006
2.7
5.7
2.3
5.6
2.3
2006-2012
1.3
-1.7
-4.1
-1.8
-4.1
2012-2018
1.4
-0.1
2.8
1.2
3.2
Total
1988-1998
3.0
2.6
2.6
1998-2006
2.5
3.7
2.9
3.6
2.8
2006-2012
1.2
0.8
-0.4
0.8
-0.4
2012-2018
1.3
0.4
1.3
0.7
1.5
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from LFS 1988 and ELMPS 1998-2018.

4.2. Trends in labor force participation
In what follows, we focus on participation using the standard market definition of the labor force.
However, Figure 11 presents all four labor force definitions. Based on the standard market
definition, participation rates have been falling from 2012 to 2018 for both men and women. For
the working-age population as a whole, standard market participation rates increased from 47% in
1998 to 52% in 2006, then fell slightly to 51% in 2012, and then fell more sharply to 48% in 2018.9
These totals hide larger differences between men and women. Among men, labor force
participation increased from 73% in 1998 to 77% in 2006 and then to 80% in 2012, only to reverse
and decrease to 76% by 2018. The decline of participation among men is, therefore, a relatively
recent phenomenon that requires further investigation.
Women in Egypt have historically had far lower participation rates than men. According to the
ILO modelled estimates, female participation rates in Egypt, at 25% in 2018 for the 15-64 age
group, were the 11th lowest among 189 countries for which the ILO produces estimates (ILO 2019).
These estimates were somewhat higher than the ELMPS 2018 estimate of 21%. According to the
The standard market labor force participation rate was significantly higher overall for 2006 and 2012 compared to
1998, but the 2018 rate was not significantly higher than 1998. Participation was significantly higher for men in 20062018 compared to 1998. It was significantly higher for women in 2006 compared to 1998, but not statistically different
comparing 2012 or 2018 to 1998.

9
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ELMPS, the female standard market labor force participation rate increased from 21% in 1998 to
a high of 27% in 2006 but declined to 23% in 2012 and back to 21% in 2018.10 The declining
trends in participation account for the growing divergence we observed between the growth of the
working age population (the potential labor supply) and the labor force (the actual labor supply).
For men and women in Egypt, the working age population was growing at a rate 1.3%-1.4% p.a.
from 2012 to 2018 (Table 2), but the standard market labor force was only growing at a rate of
0.5% p.a. for men and actually contracted at a rate of 0.1% p.a. for women in the same period. At
least in the case of women, the rapid growth in discouraged unemployment indicates that these
trends are not just due to supply side factors but may also be responding to opportunity structures
in the economy.

While standard market female labor force participation rates were similar on average in 1998, 2012, and 2018, there
were significant changes in terms of the determinants of participation such as age and education over time.

10
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Figure 11. Labor force participation rate (percentage), standard market definition, by sex
and wave, ages 15-64

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 1998-2018.
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4.3. The Age Profile of Labor Force Participation
As shown in Figure 12, labor force participation rates have the usual inverted U-shape by age for
both men and women. There were substantial declines in participation from 2012 to 2018 for men
at both ends of the age distribution. Men under the age of 35 have experienced sizable declines in
participation between 2012 and 2018. There was also a noticeable decline among men above the
age of 55. Among women, there was a substantial decline in participation from 2012 to 2018 for
all ages through age 40, likely due to diminishing opportunities for young women to work in the
public sector.11 From age 40 onward, participation rates have remained roughly the same as in
2012.
Figure 12. Labor force participation rate (percentage), standard market definition, by sex,
age and wave, ages 15-64

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 1998-2018.
Note: Lowess smoothed running mean with bandwidth 0.4.

4.4. The Education Profile of Labor Force Participation
Figure 13 shows labor force participation by educational attainment. Labor force participation rates
were lowest for men with less than intermediate education (many of whom may still have been in
school), and highest among men with little or no education (i.e. illiterate and read and write) and
for men with above intermediate education and university or higher. However, participation at
these levels for men declined in 2018 across education levels compared to previous waves. Labor
force participation among women increased with education. With increasing educational
attainment, we would expect higher overall female participation over time. This is not happening,
however, because participation rates among educated women have been decreasing substantially
over time. For example, at the intermediate level (the most common educational attainment in
11

For further discussion of employment trends by sector see Assaad, AlSharawy, and Salemi (2019).
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Egypt) participation has dropped from 42% in 1998 to 20% in 2018. Similarly, participation among
university educated women fell from 73% in 1998 to 51% in 2018. So, while participation for men
fell across all education levels, for women it declined more for the educated, although it remained
low for the less educated. The decline in participation among educated women has been attributed
to declining employment opportunities in the public sector (Assaad et al. 2018).
Figure 13. Labor force participation rate (percentage), standard market definition, by
education, sex and wave, ages 15-64

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 1998-2018.

5. The Evolution of Employment in Egypt
5.1. Trends in the Employment Rates
In this section, we examine trends in employment rates (the employment-to-population ratio).
Figure 14 shows both market and extended employment rates by sex and wave. Aside from a spike
in 2006, the extended employment rate has been falling over time. The market employment rate
rose from 42% in 1998 to 48% in 2006, dropped slightly to 47% in 2012, and then more
precipitously to 44% in 2018. Again, for males, there is little difference between the market and
extended employment rates. Like labor force participation rates, male employment rates were
rising from 1998 to 2012, but then fell from 77% in 2012 to 72% in 2018.
For women, the market employment rate is almost half the extended rate in 2018, accounting for
the large fraction of women engaged in subsistence work. Only 17% of Egyptian women aged 15-
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64 were employed in 2018 according to the market definition, which is now the accepted
international definition of employment as adopted by the 19th International Conference of Labor
Statisticians (ILO 2013). The decline in female employment rates started earlier. Female market
employment rates fell from 22% in 2006 to 18% in 2012 and declined further to 17% from 2012
to 2018.12
Figure 14. Employment rate (percentage), by sex, definition and wave, ages 15-64

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from LFS 1988 and ELMPS 1998-2018.
Note: Employment is based on a 7-day reference period.

5.2. The Age Profile of Employment Rates13
The shape of the age profile for men in market employment generally shows rising employment
rates through approximately age 30 and then a plateau at over 90% from age 30 to 55 (Figure 15).
Around age 55, male employment rates begin to decline, likely because men begin to retire.
However, in 2018, employment rates for young men looked more like 1998 patterns, and the
employment rate for prime-age men (ages 30 to 55) was lower than in any previous year. The

While the female market employment rates in 2006 and 2012 were significantly higher than in 1998, the rate in
2018 was not statistically different from 1998. Rates for men and overall were higher in 2006-2018 than in 1998.
13 The subsequent discussion focuses exclusively on the market definition of employment. See Krafft, Keo, and Fedi
(2019) for a more detailed discussion of subsistence employment among rural women in Egypt.
12
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decline in overall employment rates for men from 2012 to 2018 permeates virtually the entire age
distribution.
For women, employment rates appear to rise steadily with age until about age 40, when they flatten
out a bit and then decline when women reach their early 50s. The peak employment rate appears
to have steadily shifted to later ages from 1998 to 2006 to 2012. This shift is probably due to
women who acquired government jobs in the 1970s and 1980s retaining these jobs until retirement.
Although the age profile of employment is similar in 2012 and 2018, we do observe a decline in
employment rates for women between the ages of 20 and 50.
Figure 15. Employment rate (percentage), market definition, by sex, age and wave, ages 1564

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 1998-2018.
Notes: Employment is based on a 7-day reference period. Lowess smoothed running mean with bandwidth 0.4.

5.3. The Education Profile of Employment Rates
As in the case of labor force participation, employment rates have decreased from 2012 to 2018
across the education spectrum for men. The pattern of falling participation since 1998 for educated
women is also reflected in their employment rates. For example, employment rates for women
with intermediate education have been cut in half since 1998, going from 42% to 20% (Figure
16). A similar steadily declining trend can be seen for women with above intermediate education
and those with university education or above.14

Changes over time were statistically significant, however, educational attainment still had a positive and statistically
significant association with market employment even in 2018.
14
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Figure 16. Employment rate (percentage), market definition, by education, sex and wave,
ages 15-64

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 1998-2018.
Notes: Employment is based on a 7-day reference period.

5.4. Family Formation and Employment
After marriage, intra-household dynamics and the changing opportunity cost of time affect married
women’s decisions to work (Assaad, Krafft, and Selwaness 2017; Selwaness and Krafft 2018).
Since, according to prevalent gender norms in Egypt, women are the primary caregivers, this can
substantially shift the opportunity cost of their time and employment decisions. In Figure 17, we
look at employment rates by sex and marital status for individuals aged 15-64 who were not
enrolled in school (as this might bias results for the never married). Overall, rates of employment
for ever-married men were much higher than rates for never-married men, since employment is
almost a pre-requisite for marriage for men (Assaad, Binzel, and Gadallah 2010; Krafft and Assaad
2017). Regardless of marital status, however, employment rates for men have decreased
substantially between 2012 and 2018; rates have decreased seven percentage points (from 73% to
66%) for men who have never married and by three percentage points (from 92% to 89%) for evermarried men. These rates were even lower than they were two decades prior in 1998. In 1998,
employment rates were 67% of never-married men and 91% of ever-married men.
In contrast to men, employment rates for never-married women were slightly higher than rates for
ever-married women. While employment is a pre-requisite to marriage for men, women may work
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prior to marriage and then exit, a trend we explore further below (Assaad, Krafft, and Selwaness
2017; Krafft and Assaad 2017). However, the rate of employment for never-married women has
hardly changed over the past two decades. Most recently, in 2018 the employment rate was 25%
for never-married women compared to 23% in 1998. Similarly, the rate was only three percentage
points higher for ever-married women in 2018 compared to 1998 (increased from 16% to 19%)
and substantially lower than in 2006 (decreased from 25% to 19%).
Figure 17. Employment rate (percentage), market definition, by sex, marital status, and
wave, not enrolled in school, ages 15-64

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 1998-2018.
Notes: Ever-married women includes women who are married, divorced, and widowed. Employment is based on a 7day reference period.

Time and financial constraints related to raising children can influence women’s employment
decisions. Figure 18 examines employment rates for ever-married women aged 20-54 by their
youngest child’s age – ages 0-2, ages 3-5, ages 6-11, and ages 12-17 – compared to ever married
women with no children under 18 years old. Analyses start in 2006, the first year with birth history
data. Employment rates rise for women as their youngest child gets older. In 2018, the employment
rate was 13% for ever-married women with a youngest child under 2 years old, compared to 26%
for those with a youngest child aged 12-17. However, employment rates have been decreasing over
time across all groups. For example, in 2006, the employment rate for women with infants and
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toddlers (ages 0-2) was 18% and it declined to 13% by 2018. Among women with a youngest child
aged 12-17, the employment rate was 38% in 2006 compared to 26% in 2018.
Figure 18. Employment rate (percentage), market definition, by household composition and
wave, ever-married women aged 20-54

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 2006-2018.
Notes: Ever-married women includes women who are married, divorced, and widowed. Employment is based on a 7day reference period.

Women exit the private sector at marriage, contributing to lower employment rates among married
women. For those who have been married in the last 20 years, Figure 19 shows labor market status
by years since marriage for men and women.15 Zero represents the year of marriage. Men’s
employment rises in the run-up to marriage (negative years). Private sector employment peaks
right at marriage and remains stable for a few years thereafter before falling; this decrease is likely
men transitioning into public sector and non-wage jobs. The high rates of employment in the years
preceding marriage, for men, allow them to both be promising marital prospects and accumulate
the resources necessary to marry (Krafft and Assaad 2017). Women’s participation in private
sector employment peaks two years before marriage, drops slightly one year before marriage as
15

Note the difference in the y-axis scale between the two panels.
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women anticipate marriage, and then is cut in half from 4% to 2% the year of marriage. In contrast,
public sector employment continues to rise with time and is hardly affected by the timing of
marriage. Non-wage work also rises for women, more so at and after marriage, as new
opportunities may open up as well as non-wage work, which is often home-based, being easier to
reconcile with marriage. These trends strongly underscore the lack of compatibility between
private sector wage work and women’s marital responsibilities (Assaad, Krafft, and Selwaness
2017; Hendy 2011, 2015).
Figure 19. Employment status by years since marriage and sex (percentage), married in the
last 20 years, ages 15-64, 2018

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 2018.
Note: The y-axis scale is different across the two panels

6. The Evolution of Unemployment in Egypt
Unemployment in Egypt is primarily a structural challenge, rather than a cyclical phenomenon
(Krafft and Assaad 2014b). The age and education profile of the labor force, as well as the number
of new entrants, are key drivers of unemployment rates. We begin this section by examining trends
in unemployment rates by definition and sex. We follow with age and education profiles of the
standard market definition of unemployment by sex.
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6.1. Trends in Unemployment
Since 2006, the standard (search required) market rate of unemployment has been relatively stable,
varying between 8.2% and 8.7%, after having come down from 11.7% in 1998 (Figure 20). Since
differences in trends across the extended and market definitions of employment were similar, we
focus here on the market definition. The broad definition of unemployment, which includes the
discouraged unemployed, tells a slightly different story. While broad, market unemployment was
9.7% in 2006 and 9.6% in 2012, it increased in 2018 to 11.1%, an increase of almost two
percentage points from 2012, although it is still below 1998 rate of 13.6%.
The overall unemployment rate masks the large differences in unemployment between men and
women in Egypt. Men’s standard market unemployment rate in 2018, at 4.9%, was the same as in
2006 and slightly above where it was in 2012 (4.2%), but well below 1998 (7.0%). Broad market
unemployment rates were up in 2018 for men, rising from a low of 4.7% in 2012 to 5.8% in 2018.
Women’s unemployment rates were four times those of men (19.5% using the standard market
definition in 2018). Although women’s standard market unemployment rate fell from 2012
(23.7%) to 2018 (19.5%), the broad market unemployment rate has been rising since 2006 to
25.8% in 2012 and 27.8% in 2018. The rise in broad unemployment, wherein individuals want to
work but were not actively searching, suggests that an increasing share of individuals in the labor
force were discouraged about their job opportunities.
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Figure 20. Unemployment rate (percentage), by sex, definition and wave, ages 15-64

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 1998-2018.
Notes: Unemployment uses a 7-day reference period.
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6.2. The Age Profile of Unemployment
Unemployment is primarily a new entrant phenomenon in Egypt. As shown in Figure 21,
unemployment rates for men peaked at earlier ages, in the late teens, in 2018, and were higher for
the youngest men in 2018 than in 2006 or 2012. In those years, the peak unemployment rate for
men was closer to age 22-25. As we shall see below, these patterns are closely linked to changes
in unemployment by education. Unemployment in the 35+ range, for men, was notably higher in
2018 than in previous waves, albeit still much lower than at young ages. In 2018, unemployment
peaked at almost 40% for women aged 25 and remained over 20% through age 35. Although the
peak around age 25 was similar to 2006 and 2012, rates were higher at older ages (35+) than in
previous rounds. Unemployment for women was extending into older ages, the counterpoint to
falling employment rates at these ages.
Figure 21. Unemployment rate (percentage), standard market definition, by sex, age and
wave, ages 15-64

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 1998-2018.
Notes: Unemployment is based on a 7-day reference period. Lowess smoothed running mean with bandwidth 0.4.

6.3. The Education Profile of Unemployment
In 2018, the male unemployment rate had increased for the less educated but remained similar to
2012 for those with intermediate and higher education (Figure 22). The rise in less-educated
unemployment is linked with the rise in late teen unemployment, as less educated young men enter
the labor market early. While historically unemployment was a young, educated new entrant
phenomenon, for men at least, the unemployment-education relationship has weakened
considerably over time. The female unemployment rate in 2018 had also increased for the less
educated, but unemployment rates remained highest among those with intermediate and higher
education, around 25%. This rate has prevailed for the university educated since 2006. Notably,
the unemployment rate for those with intermediate education fell substantially between 2012 and
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2018. Since these women have not increased their employment, they are particularly likely to be
withdrawing from participation.
Figure 22. Unemployment rate (percentage), standard market definition, by highest
education, sex and wave, ages 15-64

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ELMPS 1998-2018.
Note: Unemployment is based on a 7-day reference period.

7. Conclusions
Over the past thirty years, Egypt has experienced demographic developments that have strongly
shaped the size and composition of labor supply. The most notable among them is the emergence
of the youth bulge phenomenon in the late 1980s and 1990s. The “bulge” is now well past peak
labor market insertion ages. The aging of the bulge has led to very slow growth or even contraction
of the youth and young adult populations in recent years and therefore attenuated labor supply
pressures. Nevertheless, these pressures will soon start building again as the large “echo”
generation, the children of the youth bulge generation, reach labor market entry age in the next ten
to fifteen years. The size of this generation was made even bigger by a temporary but substantial
increase in fertility that occurred between 2008 and 2012. This generation, centered around school
entry age, has placed enormous pressures on the schooling system and this pressure will soon be
transmitted to labor markets. Policymakers need to prepare for these forthcoming challenges.
Education levels continue to rise in Egypt, albeit less rapidly than before, as secondary education
has massified and university enrollments have reached higher levels.
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The attenuation of demographic pressures on labor supply has been compounded by decreasing
participation (and employment) rates among both men and women. The decline in participation
among women has been ongoing for a while despite the closing of the gender gap in education and
the historically strong relationship between participation and education for Egyptian women. In
fact, falling participation rates among educated women have more than made up for the shifting
composition toward higher education groups, leading to an overall drop in women’s participation.
The decline in participation among educated women can in turn be explained by declining
employment opportunities in the public sector at a time when the private sector continues to be
inhospitable to women, particularly married women (Assaad et al. 2018).
The decline in participation among men is a more recent phenomenon that is less well understood.
The falling participation spanned a variety of ages well beyond the ages of schooling, suggesting
that it was not just a delay due to rising levels of education. Some of it was at the older end of the
age distribution, suggesting earlier retirements. The decline involved men at all education levels
and not just those who may be pursuing more schooling. Coupled with evidence about rising rates
of discouraged unemployment, it suggests that the declining trend in participation may be due, at
least in part, to deteriorating opportunity structures, but this is clearly a trend in need of further
investigation.
Unemployment, by the standard definition, has remained very stable, however, broad
unemployment, which does not require active job search, has increased, implying higher levels of
discouragement. The increase in discouragement is much higher among women than among men,
further suggesting that declining participation is due to a less hospitable labor market. There are
signs that unemployment has decreased for educated men but risen for the less educated as well as
those in their teens and prime aged; this constitutes an important shift in the nature of male
unemployment away from educated new entrants. For women, unemployment remains
predominantly an educated, new entrant phenomenon, although now persisting into even later
ages. Continuing to track and further research these developments will be critically important for
understanding the future of Egypt’s labor market and economy.
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